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Articles
HUCH V. CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS, INC.:
CONSUMER PREY, CORPORATE PREDATORS,
AND A CALL FOR THE DEATH OF THE
VOLUNTARY PAYMENT DOCTRINE DEFENSE
John E. Campbell* & Oliver Beatty**
“[These laws] come[] from an order of men, whose interest is
never exactly the same with that of the public, who have
generally an interest to deceive and even to oppress the public,
and who accordingly have, upon many occasions, both
deceived and oppressed it.”
-Adam Smith, Wealth of Nations1
“[T]he nature of any human being, certainly anyone on Wall
Street, is the better deal you give the customer, the worse deal
it is for you.”
-Bernard Madoff2

*
John Campbell, a former high school inner-city teacher, is now the manager of the
consumer law and class action department at The Simon Law Firm, P.C. He serves as an
adjunct professor at Saint Louis University School of Law, teaching Civil Practice. John
graduated from Saint Louis University in 2006, magna cum laude. He was co-author of the
briefing regarding Huch v. Charter, a case discussed herein, and argued the case before the
Missouri Supreme Court. John was recognized in 2010 as one of the “Most Influential
Appellate Attorneys” in Missouri.
** Oliver Beatty, a former advocate for Latino Cultural Center of Purdue University, is a
recent graduate of the Saint Louis University School of Law. During his tenure he served
as an editor for the Saint Louis University Law Journal Board, member of the National Trial
Team, and had his own Dear Oliver humor/advice column, much to the demise of the
student body.
1
ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS
288 (Edwin Cannan ed., 1994) (1776).
2
See The Future of the Stock Market, PHILOCTETES (Oct. 20, 2007, 2:30 PM),
http://philoctetes.org/event/the_future_of_the_stock_market
(providing
Bernard
Madoff’s statements during a panel discussion at the Philoctetes Center, including his view
that “when you take the human being out of the equation, you solve your regulatory
problems because the nature of any human being, certainly anyone on Wall Street, is the
better deal you give the customer, the worse deal it is for you”).
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I. INTRODUCTION
If a cashier gives you too much change at the store, you give it back.
That is what most of our parents taught us; they taught us it was the
right thing to do, but our parents had never heard of the voluntary
payment doctrine (“VPD”). The VPD is an ancient equitable defense that
leaves most attorneys scratching their heads;3 and until recently, it posed
an imminent threat of gutting many consumer protection laws by
allowing companies to retain money from unsuspecting consumers who
paid due to the companies’ mistakes, or in some cases, outright fraud.
The VPD states that, absent fraud or duress, one who makes a
voluntary payment with full knowledge of all material facts is not
entitled to recover the payment.4 This sounds benign enough; however,
in recent times, some companies have attempted to distort the VPD into
a rule that allows companies to reap tremendous windfalls by collecting
illegal payments and then arguing that those who paid should be barred
from recovering their money.5 Under the version of the VPD that
companies sought to create, if the clerk gave a purchaser too much
money in return, then the purchaser could keep it. When the store
sought a refund, that person could keep the money even though she did
not deserve it, because the clerk had given her too much change with full
knowledge of the facts in the absence of fraud or duress. Companies
seized upon the VPD and argued that it applied even if the company
took affirmative steps to induce payments by a consumer who was not
obligated to make such payments.6 Courts applied this doctrine even if
the company engaged in consumer fraud.7 As a result, the VPD posed a
very real threat to the effectiveness of consumer fraud acts.

See generally Bilbie v. Lumley, (1802) 2 East 469 (1802 ER 448) (establishing this rule in
England in the 1800s).
4
See, e.g., Claflin v. McDonough, 33 Mo. 412, 416 (1863) (“[T]he plaintiffs paid the
money with a full knowledge of all the facts and circumstances, and well knowing that
they were under no legal obligations to pay it. It must, therefore, be regarded as a
voluntary payment, and not a payment under duress.”)
5
See, e.g., King v. First Capital Fin. Servs. Corp., 828 N.E.2d 1155, 1171 (Ill. 2005); Harris
v. ChartOne, 841 N.E.2d 1028, 1031 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005); Indoor Billboard/Wash., Inc. v.
Integra Telecom of Wash., Inc., 170 P.3d 10, 23 (Wash. 2007).
6
See Time Warner Entm’t Co. v. Whiteman, 802 N.E.2d 886, 891–93 (Ind. 2004) (noting
that Warner took affirmative steps to induce payments through late fee provisions, which
Warner argued constituted valid liquidated damage clauses); Eisel v. Midwest Bankcentre,
230 S.W.3d 335, 339 (Mo. 2007) (en banc) (arguing that the voluntary payment doctrine
barred plaintiffs’ recovery because they voluntarily paid document preparation fees); Pratt
v. Smart Corp., 968 S.W.2d 868, 871 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998) (asserting the VPD defense to bar
plaintiff’s recovery after voluntarily paying an invoice).
7
See Time Warner, 802 N.E.2d at 893; Eisel, 230 S.W.3d at 339–40.
3
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Although the VPD had equitable justifications and had roots
reaching back almost 400 years,8 it threatened to become a tool of
inequity. This rise of the VPD, corresponding with an era marked by
corporate fraud, posed serious concerns for the orderly functioning of
the marketplace. Although the VPD had become largely extinct in the
mid-twentieth century, courts began to examine the VPD anew in the
1990s and early 2000s,9 and based on those decisions, the VPD showed
some signs of rising from the proverbial ashes. The trend began when a
string of decisions relating to cable companies recognized the VPD as a
defense to excessive late fees. Multiple state supreme courts held that
the doctrine could serve as a bar to recovery in at least some cases.
Simultaneously, a host of other courts reiterated that the VPD was a
viable defense, perhaps even to consumer class actions.10
The wave of pro-business VPD decisions reached full swell in Huch
v. Charter Communications, Inc. (“Huch I”). The Missouri Court of
Appeals for the Eastern District held that the VPD allowed Charter, a
cable company, to keep charges that it collected for merchandise that
people never requested.11 The procedural posture of the case was
especially interesting: The trial court granted a motion to dismiss. This
meant that, even though the trial court took the plaintiffs’ allegations—
that Charter Communications, Inc. (“Charter”) illegally billed for
unsolicited merchandise in violation of specific Missouri laws
prohibiting such behavior—as true, the VPD still served as a complete
bar to recovery.12 Indeed, defendants in other cases immediately cited
the affirmation by the appellate court as a reason to throw a number of
claims out of court.13 The decision meant that even in the face of fraud
and illegal profit, consumers could lose the right to recover if they did
not detect the fraud and refuse to pay immediately. For a bleak moment,
it appeared the VPD would rise as a justification for corporate theft and
negligence precisely when consumer remedies were most needed to help
rebuild waning consumer confidence, and in doing so, it would become
a powerful defense to many consumer fraud claims regarding tacking on
of charges, cramming, illegal renewal, and a host of other forms of
See generally Bilbie, 2 East 469.
See supra note 5 (providing cases where courts examined the VPD anew in the early
2000s).
10
See supra note 5 (presenting cases involving courts that recognized the VPD as a viable
defense).
11
Huch v. Charter Commc’ns, Inc., No. ED 89926, 2008 WL 1721868, at *9 (Mo. Ct. App.
Apr. 15, 2008).
12
See id. (holding that the trial court did not err in granting Charter’s motion to dismiss,
as the VPD barred recovery).
13
E.g., Sobel v. Hertz Corp., 698 F. Supp. 2d 1218, 1222 (D. Nev. 2010).
8
9
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consumer fraud. If the story ended with Huch I, this would be a bleak
Article for those who advocate for vigorous consumer protection.
In Huch v. Charter Communications, Inc. (“Huch II”), however, the en
banc Missouri Supreme Court reversed the lower court and fully
discussed the collision between the VPD and modern consumer fraud
statutes.14 The court held that the VPD does not apply to Missouri’s
unfair deceptive acts and practices (“UDAP”) statute, known as the
Merchandising Practices Act.15 The Missouri Supreme Court’s decision
is seminal, and subsequent courts around the country are already citing
it.16 However, the VPD’s future is not fully written. This Article argues
for the adoption of Huch II reasoning throughout the country, allowing
for the continued eradication of the VPD from modern consumer
jurisprudence.
In Part II, this Article addresses the history of the VPD, including its
roots in England. Part III discusses the likely trajectory of the VPD both
in the United States and internationally. In conclusion, Part IV addresses
the public policy concerns that require the VPD to be fully eliminated
from consumer jurisprudence, thereby fully adopting the logic of a
previous court, which stated that “[s]uch a rule . . . could become a
mighty instrument of evil, and might . . . be used to defend against all
manner of thefts and larceny and the illegal frittering away of the public
money.”17
II. THE HISTORY OF THE VPD
A. England
America inherited the VPD from England in its early history. It is
closely related to the mistake of law doctrine,18 and in many states today,
the VPD is only available as a defense when the mistake that induced

14
See Huch v. Charter Commc’ns, Inc., 290 S.W.3d 721, 727 (Mo. 2009) (en banc)
(addressing VPD and its applicability to a violation of the Merchandising Practices Act).
15
Id.; see also MO. REV. STAT. §§ 407.010–407.1129 (2006 & Supp. 2012).
16
See Sobel, 698 F. Supp. 2d at 1222–23; Southstar Energy Servs., LLC v. Ellison, 691
S.E.2d 203, 206–07 (Ga. 2010).
17
Lamar Twp. v. City of Lamar, 169 S.W. 12, 16 (Mo. 1914) (citing Sheldon v. S. Sch. Dist.
in W. Soc. of Suffield, 24 Conn. 88 (1855)); see Norton v. Marden, 15 Me. 45 (1838); City of
Baltimore v. Lefferman, 4 Gill 425 (Md. 1846); Preston v. City of Boston, 29 Mass. (12 Pick.)
7, 13 (Mass. 1831); Clarke v. Dutcher, 9 Cow. 674 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1824).
18
See Duncan Sheehan, The Origins of the Mistake of Law Bar in English Law 8 (Univ. of E.
Anglia Norwich Law Sch., Working Paper No. NLSWP 08/01, 2008), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1113723 (providing a complete discussion of the development of
the mistake of law doctrine—including its relationship to the VPD—in England).
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payment was one of law, rather than fact.19 A mistake of law occurs
when a party is “ignoran[t] of a rule or principle of law or [reaches] an
erroneous conclusion as to the operation of the law upon a known set of
facts.”20
In English law traceable to the 1600s, there was no distinction
between a mistake of law and a mistake of fact. A person who paid
money under a mistake of law or fact was generally able to seek recovery
in an action called indebitatus assumpsit.21 It was not until 1802, in Bilbie v.
Lumley, that Lord Ellenborough indicated that a mistake of law that
induced payment would not allow for the recovery of money paid with
full knowledge of all facts.22 This maxim was imported from England’s
criminal law, where a defendant’s ignorance of the illegality of his
conduct was no defense. 23 Lord Ellenborough reasoned that a party
should not be able to recover an amount paid simply because his
ignorance of the law induced the payment.24 His concern was that
parties who have made payments will seek the courts’ assistance in
recovering those payments once they learn that there was no legal
obligation to pay. In Lord Ellenborough’s words, “[e]very man must be
taken to be cognizant of the law; otherwise there is no saying to what
extent the excuse of ignorance might not be carried. It would be urged in
almost every case.”25
Bilbie proved to be a turning point. The English cases that followed
Bilbie continued to allow recovery of payments when they were made
under mistake of fact or induced by fraud or duress, but precluded
recovery if the mistake was one of law. For example, in Kelly v. Solari, 26
agents of the insurance company had forgotten that the defendant’s
policy had lapsed because a premium had gone unpaid, and the plaintiff,
a director of a life insurance company, made payment on the policy

19
See Claflin v. McDonough, 33 Mo. 412, 416 (1863) (citing multiple state cases where
plaintiffs were denied recovery because the mistake that induced payment was not a
mistake of law, even though the various plaintiffs made the payment with a full knowledge
of all the facts and circumstances).
20
27 RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 70:123 (4th ed. 2003).
21
LAW REFORM COMM’N, COMMUNITY LAW REFORM PROGRAM: ELEVENTH REPORT—
RESTITUTION OF BENEFITS CONFERRED UNDER MISTAKE OF LAW 53, § 2.2–2.3 (1987), available
at http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/lrc.nsf/pages/R53TOC.
22
(1802) 2 East 469, 470–72.
23
The rule is often stated as follows: ignorantia legis non excusat, or “ignorance of the law
is no excuse.” See, e.g., Beck v. Thompson & Maris, 4 H. & J. 531, 533 (Md. 1819) (citing
Bilbie, 2 East at 471).
24
See Bilbie, 2 East at 471–72.
25
Id. at 472.
26
(1841) 9 M. & W. 54, 54.
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under the mistake of fact. 27 The court held that the plaintiff was entitled
to recover.28 The court took a firm stance, stating that “it is in every case
unconscientious to retain money paid under a mistake of fact.”29
B. The United States
Even though some justices found the principle laid out in Bilbie
controversial, it was eventually adopted in the New World.30 For better
or for worse, the distinction between a mistake of fact (for which
restitution could be sought) and a mistake of law (for which restitution
could not be sought) began to appear in the United States.31 In Missouri,
for example, the VPD emerged during the Civil War in the case of Claflin
v. McDonough in 1863.32 In Claflin, the plaintiffs paid a city tax collector
the full amount demanded under threat that they would be indicted if
they did not pay.33 The Missouri Supreme Court articulated the VPD as
follows: “[A] person who voluntarily pays money with full knowledge
of all the facts in the case, and in the absence of fraud and duress, cannot
recover it back, though the payment is made without a sufficient
consideration, and under protest.”34 Based on this articulation, the court
held that the plaintiffs were barred from recovering the overpayment.35
Although decisions like Claflin were not uncommon, even during
this early period, courts in some states opposed the VPD. For example,
Kentucky and Connecticut rejected the doctrine from the outset.36 Under
Connecticut common law any time a party obtained money that it was
not owed, that money should be disgorged.37 The Supreme Court of
Connecticut held in Northrop v. Graves:
[W]e mean distinctly to assert, that, when money is paid
by one, under a mistake of his rights and his duty, and
which he was under no legal or moral obligation to pay,
and which the recipient has no right in good conscience
to retain, it may be recovered back, in an action of
Id.
Id.
29
Id. at 57.
30
See Bank of the United States v. Daniel, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 32, 57–58 (1838); Hunt v.
Rousmanier’s Adm’rs, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 174, 211–12, 215–16 (1823).
31
See, e.g., Beck v. Thompson & Maris, 4 H. & J. 531, 533 (Md. 1819).
32
33 Mo. 412 (1863).
33
Id. at 414.
34
Id. at 415.
35
Id. at 416.
36
Northrop’s Ex’rs v. Graves, 19 Conn. 548, 560 (1849); Underwood v. Brockman, 39 Ky.
(4 Dana) 309, 319–20 (1836).
37
See Northrop’s Ex’rs, 19 Conn. at 548.
27
28
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indebitatus assumpsit, whether such mistake be one of fact
or of law; and this we insist, may be done, both upon the
principle of Christian morals and the common law.38
Connecticut’s outright rejection was the exception, not the rule.
Many states and courts adopted the VPD, allowing recovery only when
there was a mistake of fact, fraud, or duress.39 However, courts routinely
wrestled with the day-to-day inequities the VPD could create. In fact,
courts became so adept in promulgating many exceptions and
qualifications that some observers noted that “[o]ne more often
encounters the ‘luxuriant undergrowth of exceptions to the general rule’
than applications of the rule itself.”40 The three exceptions articulated by
courts were: mistake of fact, fraud, and duress.
1.

Mistake of Fact

The line between a mistake of law and a mistake of fact is a blurry
one, and the distinction is often painfully difficult to elucidate.41 As
discussed above, a payor’s mistake about a fact material to the payment
will preclude the voluntary payment defense,42 since the payor did not
make the payment voluntarily.43 A mistake of fact occurs where a party
possesses “unconscious ignorance or forgetfulness of” a material fact.44

38
Id. at 554. The Northrop court was generally concerned that the distinction between a
mistake of law and a mistake of fact promoted form over substance. Id. When discussing
maxims such as “every man is bound, and therefore ‘presumed, to know the law,’” the court
stated:
These [maxims], and all other general doctrines and aphorisms, when
properly applied to facts and in furtherance of justice, should be
carefully regarded; but the danger is, that they are often pressed into
the service of injustice, by a misapplication of their true meaning. It is
better to yield to the force of truth and conscience, than to any
reverence for maxims.
Id. at 553–54.
39
See Jones v. Watkins, 1 Stew. 81 (Ala. 1827); Mayor of Baltimore v. Lefferman, 4 Gill
425, 436–37 (Md. 1846); Robinson v. City Council of Charleston, 31 S.C.L. (2 Rich.) 317, 319
(S.C. Ct. App. 1846); Lewis v. Cooper, 3 Tenn. (Cooke) 467, 473–74 (1814).
40
LAW REFORM COMM’N, supra note 21, at 53, § 1.3 (footnote omitted).
41
See Kenneth W. Simons, Mistake of Fact or Mistake of Criminal Law? Explaining and
Defending the Distinction 11 (Boston Univ. Sch. of Law, Working Paper No. 08-32, 2008),
available at http://www.bu.edu/law/faculty/scholarship/workingpapers/SimonsMistake
ofFact.html.
42
Claflin v. McDonough, 33 Mo. 412 (Mo. 1863).
43
Wheeler v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 91 N.W. 890, 890 (Minn. 1902).
44
Kowalke v. Milwaukee Electric Ry. & Light Co., 79 N.W. 762, 763 (Wis. 1899) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
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For example, in Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Nix, the defendant-policy
holder misrepresented to the plaintiff-insurance company that her
husband’s injury was not employment-related, as he had fallen off a
horse on his personal time.45 Had the husband’s injury arisen out of
employment, the defendant and plaintiff’s health insurance contract
would not have covered his medical expenses.46 The insurance company
paid out on the policy and then brought suit to recover the payments,
claiming it was mistaken as to whether the defendant’s husband was
injured within the scope of employment, and thus whether payment was
owed under the contract.47 Consistent with the VPD, the court held that
because the insurance company’s payments were induced by its
mistaken belief about the circumstances of the husband’s injury, the
insurance company was entitled to recover.48 Similar to the Nix case,
taxes paid under a mistake of fact have often been held recoverable by
the taxpayer.49
2.

Fraud

A look at early American cases demonstrates that the VPD was not
intended to allow intentional wrongdoers to profit from their illegal
Courts almost immediately recognized that the fraud
actions.50
exception was a broad protection, which applied even when no common
law fraud had occurred.51 Indeed, early recitations of the VPD make
clear that the “fraud” exception was shorthand, intended to cover a wide
range of wrongdoing, often designated as “improper conduct.”52 For
example, in National Enameling & Stamping Co. v. City of St. Louis, the
Missouri Supreme Court made clear that fraud and improper conduct
were exceptions to the rule:
Except where it is otherwise provided by statute it is
held by the great preponderance of adjudged cases that,
where one under a mistake of law, or in ignorance of
law, but with full knowledge of all the facts, and in the
absence of fraud or improper conduct upon the part of
512 P.2d 1251, 1252 (N.M. 1973).
Id.
47
Id. at 1252–53.
48
Id. at 1253.
49
See Wheeler v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 91 N.W. 890, 890 (Minn. 1902).
50
See supra Part II.B (discussing early American cases where the VPD could not be used
to bar recovery when intentional wrongdoers profited from their illegal actions).
51
See Bank of the United States v. Daniel, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 32, 56 (1838); Hunt v.
Rousmanier’s Adm’rs, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 174, 211 (1823).
52
Nat’l Enameling & Stamping Co. v. City of St. Louis, 40 S.W.2d 593, 595 (Mo. 1931).
45
46
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the payee, voluntarily and without compulsion pays
money on a demand not legally enforceable against him,
he can not [sic] recover it back.53
Many states followed the “fraud or improper conduct”
formulation.54 Thus, the traditional formulation of the VPD limited its
application to situations in which there was no improper conduct on the
part of the payee.55 Therefore, a payor-plaintiff was not necessarily
required to have a colorable claim for common law fraud against the
payee-defendant to come within the protection of this exception.56 Huch
I called this rule into question where the court held that claims of
consumer fraud were not sufficient to defeat the VPD defense.57
3.

Duress

A payor who is under compulsion or duress at the time of payment
may recover such payment from the payee if the payee was the source of
the duress.58 Duress traditionally consists of a threat by a party to do
something that he has no legal right to do.59 Courts have held that
duress undermines the voluntary nature of the payment.60 The decisions
in many of these early cases focused on the unequal bargaining power
between the two parties and the violation of basic public policy that
results from retaining monies paid under duress.61
By and large, the degree of coercion necessary to prevent the
application of the VPD decreased over time.62 In other words, alleged

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Soc’y v. Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors &
Publishers, 19 N.W.2d 540, 545 (Neb. 1945); see, e.g., Evans v. Gale, 17 N.H. 573, 575 (1845);
Craig v. Lininger, 61 Pa. Super. 339, 343 (1915); Nelson v. Swenson, 124 A. 468, 468–69 (R.I.
1924); Hawkinson v. Conniff, 334 P.2d 540, 543 (Wash. 1959).
55
See, e.g., Pingree v. Mut. Gas Co., 65 N.W. 6, 7 (Mich. 1895) (holding that “artifice,
fraud, or deception” are exceptions).
56
State ex rel. Webster v. Areaco Inv. Co., 756 S.W.2d 633, 635 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988) (“It is
not necessary in order to establish ‘unlawful practice’ [under Missouri’s Merchandising
Practices Act (“MMPA”)] to prove the elements of common law fraud.”).
57
See Huch v. Charter Commc’ns, Inc., No. ED 89926, 2008 WL 1721868, at *9 (Mo. Ct.
App. Apr. 15, 2008).
58
Smith v. Prime Cable of Chi., 658 N.E.2d 1325, 1330 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995).
59
28 RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 71:26 (4th ed. 2003).
60
See, e.g., Galesburg & Great E. R.R. Co. v. West, 108 Ill. App. 504, 509 (Ill. App. Ct.
1903) (describing a transaction, which “is attended by a degree of financial coercion or
business duress which deprives the transaction of every vestige of a voluntary payment”).
61
Id.
62
Id.
53
54
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victims of duress are offered more protection today than in the past.63
Indeed, many courts did not take long to expand the duress exception
beyond threats of physical harm to include moral duress,64
business/economic duress,65 and legal duress,66 which can be less than
the threat of criminal prosecution.67 For example, in Albany v. Abbott,68
the New Hampshire Supreme Court held that because “[t]he law
properly regards the lender on usury as the oppressor, and the borrower
as the oppressed, and therefore will not treat the payment of usurious
interest as a voluntary payment,” the borrower in usury is entitled to
recover the illegal interest.69
C. Modern Trends
Despite the general trend toward more exceptions and less frequent
application of the VPD during most of the twentieth century, the VPD
remained a sometimes valid and viable defense, even though its
parameters were somewhat unclear.
By the early 1990s, the VPD had not yet been tested against the
increasingly ubiquitous consumer fraud statutes and consumer class
actions. In its first outings it fared well, however, showing renewed
usage and vitality when cable companies that were being sued for unfair
and deceptive practices began pleading the VPD as an affirmative
defense.70 In several cases, courts recognized the defense, and in some of
the first examples, entire classes of claims were swept away as a result.71
63
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 176 cmt. a (1981) (“Courts first
recognized [duress] as improper threats of physical violence and later included wrongful
seizure or detention of goods.”).
64
See Ark. Natural Gas Co. v. Norton Co., 263 S.W. 775, 778 (Ark. 1924); Standard Box
Co. v. Mut. Biscuit Co., 10 Cal. App. 746, 761 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1909); Rees v. Schmits, 164
Ill. App. 250, 258 (1911); Niedermeyer v. Curators of the Univ. of Mo., 61 Mo. App. 654, 660
(1895); Albany v. Abbott, 61 N.H. 157, 158 (1881).
65
See Ark. Natural Gas Co., 263 S.W. at 778; Am. Mfg. Co. v. City of St. Louis, 192 S.W.
402, 403 (Mo. 1917) (en banc).
66
See City of Maysville v. Melton, 42 S.W. 754, 755 (Ky. 1897); Cox v. Welcher, 36 N.W.
69, 69 (Mich. 1888); Miss. Valley Trust Co. v. Begley, 252 S.W. 76, 78 (Mo. 1923) (en banc);
Forrest v. Mayor of New York, 13 Abb. Pr. 350, 352 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1861).
67
See Newberry v. City of Detroit, 150 N.W. 838, 839–40 (Mich. 1915) (holding that a
taxpayer who paid an illegal tax after a lien was placed on his land was under legal duress,
and therefore entitled to recover the amount of tax paid).
68
61 N.H. at 158.
69
Id.
70
See Telescripps Cable Co. v. Welsh, 542 S.E.2d 640, 643 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000); Dillon v.
U-A Columbia Cablevision of Westchester, Inc., 790 N.E.2d 1155, 1156 (N.Y. 2003);
McWethy v. Telecomms., Inc., 988 P.2d 356, 357–58 (Okla. Civ. App. 1999); Putnam v. Time
Warner Cable of Se. Wis., Ltd. P’ship, 649 N.W.2d 626, 637 (Wis. 2002).
71
See cases cited supra note 70.
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Although each case had a slightly different set of facts, a common theme
emerged. The cable companies asserted that the VPD barred recovery
because even if the fees were illegal, the customers did not identify the
fee and challenge it before paying. The companies argued that the
ability to discover the fee, and payment in the face of at least that
potential knowledge, equaled a voluntary payment with full knowledge
of the facts.72 Just like that, the VPD resurfaced as a renewed tool of
choice for defendants who have allegedly cheated customers. The caveat
emptor tone of the court decisions signified a potential erosion of
consumer rights.
In addition to the cable companies mentioned above, several other
corporate defendants have utilized the VPD as a defense to consumer
class action claims. They also prevailed. For example, in 2006 the
Supreme Court of Wisconsin held that customers were at fault for not
inquiring about an illegal sales tax that Ameritech, a telecommunications
company, was collecting contrary to state statutes. As a result, the VPD
eliminated the customers’ right to seek recovery.73 The cell phone
industry followed, prevailing in a 2007 decision in the United States
District Court for the Western District of Washington striking down a
class action challenging extra-contractual and undisclosed surcharges in
cell phone bills.74 The string of consumer defeats continued with similar
holdings in New York and Texas.75 As a result, in the years just before
Huch I, the VPD had become a staple corporate defense—a ready-made
antique doctrine that could excuse even fraudulent billing. Huch I was
an extension of these decisions, holding that consumers had no recourse
against even the per se illegal charges if the consumer did not discover
them in the first instance, refuse to pay, and file a claim.76
III. HUCH V. CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS, INC.
A. The Rise of the UDAP Statutes
Statutory protection for consumers, in the form of UDAP provisions,
started with the Federal Trade Commission Act in 1914 (“FTC Act”).77
The FTC Act banned deceptive acts and practices and became the
template for many of the state-based consumer protection statutes
See cases cited supra note 70.
See Butcher v. Ameritech Corp., 727 N.W.2d 546, 556 (Wis. Ct. App. 2006).
74
See Riensche v. Cingular Wireless, LLC, No. C06-1325Z, 2007 WL 3407137 (W.D.
Wash. Nov. 9, 2007).
75
See Spagnola v. Chubb Corp., No. 06 Civ. 9960(HB), 2007 WL 927198, at *3 (S.D.N.Y.
Mar. 27, 2007); Dall. Cnty. Cmty. Coll. Dist. v. Bolton, 185 S.W.3d 868, 876–88 (Tex. 2005).
76
See supra note 3 and accompanying text (discussing Huch I).
77
See 15 U.S.C. §§ 41–58 (2006).
72
73
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spanning several decades, including the 1960s and 1970s.78 The rise of
these state-based UDAP statutes is significant for two reasons: (1) the
original FTC Act did not allow for state or private enforcements; and (2)
these state statutes curb the doctrine of caveat emptor, in the process
establishing a level of fairness in the marketplace.79 By enacting these
statutes, legislators sought to offer consumers broad protection from a
wide range of dishonest and abusive business practices. Courts tend to
guard the UDAP provisions and draft them with broad applicability to
the extent that “[a]lmost any abusive business practice aimed at
consumers is at least arguably a UDAP violation.”80 Nowadays, every
state in the union has some sort of legislation designed to address unfair
and deceptive acts and practices.81
Missouri’s UDAP statute is called the Missouri Merchandising
Practices Act (“MMPA”).82 It was designed to protect consumers and to
preserve fundamental honesty, fair play, and right dealings in public
transactions.83 The MMPA was enacted in 1967 as a shield against
predatory business practices and as a supplement to the preexisting
common-law fraud cause of action; it is broad in purpose, language, and
application.84 The Missouri Supreme Court has described the definition
of an unfair practice as “all-encompassing and exceedingly broad. For

78
See Brief for Gateway Legal Servs., Inc. et. al. as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Appellants, Huch v. Charter Commc’ns, Inc., 290 S.W.3d 721 (Mo. 2009) (No. SC 89361),
available at http://www.courts.mo.gov/SUP/index.nsf/0/59519718166b0a8d862574cc0074
3185/$FILE/SC89361_Gateway_Legal_Services_Amicus_Brief.pdf (noting that the UDAP
“statutory provisions are enforced in all 50 states . . . [and] were enacted in the 1960s and
1970s”).
79
NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE ACTS AND PRACTICES 1 (7th ed.
2008).
80
Id. at 2. For example, New York prohibits “[d]eceptive acts or practices in the conduct
of any business, trade or commerce or in the furnishing of any service.” N.Y. GEN. BUS.
LAW § 349(a) (McKinney 2011); see also State ex rel. Webster v. Areaco Inv. Co., 756 S.W.2d
633, 635 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988) (“It is the defendant’s conduct, not his intent, which
determines whether a violation has occurred.”); Indoor Billboard/Wash., Inc. v. Integra
Telecom of Wash., Inc., 170 P.3d 10, 18 (Wash. 2007) (construing Washington UDAP statute
as prohibiting acts and practices that have the mere “capacity” to deceive, and rejecting any
intent requirement (emphasis omitted)).
81
See NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., supra note 79, at 1033–54.
82
MO. REV. STAT. § 407.010–407.1129 (2006 & Supp 2012).
83
See Ports Petroleum Co. of Ohio v. Nixon, 37 S.W.3d 237, 241 (Mo. 2001) (en banc);
State ex rel. Nixon v. Cont’l Ventures Inc., 84 S.W.3d 114, 117 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002); State ex
rel. Ashcroft v. Mktg. Unlimited of Am., Inc., 613 S.W.2d 440, 445 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981); Brief
for the Attorney Gen. of Mo. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellants, Huch v. Charter
Commc’ns, Inc., 290 S.W.3d 721 (Mo. 2009) (No. SC 89361), 2008 WL 3852934.
84
Brief for the Attorney Gen. of Mo., supra note 83, at 6.
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better or worse, the literal words cover every practice imaginable and
every unfairness to whatever degree.”85
B. U.S. Trends on the Eve of Huch I
Some statutes explicitly eliminate the VPD as a defense.86 In other
words, the payor may obtain relief even if he or she made the payment
voluntarily and with full knowledge of all the facts. Even in the absence
of explicit statutory preclusion of the VPD, however, courts have often
found the defense to be incompatible with the broad protection intended
to be provided by consumer protection statutes and have refused to
allow it as a defense.87 One example is the Supreme Court of
Washington stating that “the [VPD] is inappropriate as an affirmative
defense in the CPA [(“Consumer Protection Act”)] context, as a matter of
law, because we construe the CPA liberally in favor of plaintiffs.”88
Additionally, both of Tennessee’s appellate courts and the Indiana
Supreme Court have similarly held that the VPD will not bar consumer
claims against businesses that destroy marketplace confidence and
operate as predators in violation of UDAP statutes.89
In Pratt v. Smart Corp.,90 a patient brought a claim to recover
payment under the Medical Records Act for excessive fees paid for
obtaining medical records from a copy company, and the company
raised the VPD as an affirmative defense.91 The Tennessee Court of
Appeals stated definitively that “the [s]tate has an interest in transactions
that involve violations of statutorily-defined public policy, and,
generally speaking, in such situations, the voluntary payment rule will
not be applicable.”92 The court continued, stating that “where public
policy has been established by a legislative enactment, a transaction that
is violative of that policy is subject to inquiry even though it may be fully
Nixon, 37 S.W.3d at 240.
See, e.g., TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. § 305.001(a) (West 2006) (“A creditor who contracts for,
charges, or receives interest that is greater than the amount authorized by this subtitle in
connection with a transaction for personal, family, or household use is liable to the
obligor.”).
87
See, e.g., MacDonell v. PHH Mortg. Corp., 846 N.Y.S.2d 223, 224 (App. Div. 2007)
(explaining VPD does not bar statutory causes of action in New York); Indoor
Billboard/Wash., Inc. v. Integra Telecom of Wash., Inc., 170 P.3d 10, 24 (Wash. 2007)
(holding that “the [VPD] is inappropriate as an affirmative defense” to Washington’s
Consumer Protection Act).
88
Indoor Billboard, 170 P.3d at 24.
89
See Time Warner Entm’t Co. v. Whiteman, 802 N.E.2d 886, 893 (Ind. 2004); Pratt v.
Smart Corp., 968 S.W.2d 868, 872 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997).
90
968 S.W.2d at 868.
91
Id. at 869–71.
92
Id. at 872.
85
86
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consummated.”93 The court noted that in its case law, the VPD “does not
come into play in situations involving a transaction that violates public
policy,” thus reversing the trial court’s grant of summary judgment and
dismantling the VPD on such claims.94 New York, Illinois, and Indiana
followed Tennessee’s trend, with the latter stating that “we do not
believe that it is appropriate as a matter of policy for us to favor a private
enterprise over private individuals,” thereby stripping the VPD as a
defense to a class action against a cable company for excessive late fees.95
C. The Facts of Huch
In a Missouri-based class action suit, plaintiffs James Huch and Ryan
Carstens alleged that the defendant cable company, Charter, committed
a deceptive and unfair business practice by sending an unsolicited
channel guide to its customers and charging for the guide without
notifying the customers that it had been added to their bill.96 Plaintiffs
brought suit under the MMPA, section 407.025, which enables
consumers who have suffered a loss stemming from an unlawful, unfair,
or unethical business practice (as defined in section 407.200), which
affected their purchase or lease of merchandise.97 Specifically, plaintiffs
asserted that Charter had failed to give customers the option to receive
the guide despite it not being included in the monthly rate; sent the
guide unsolicited to customers; failed to disclose the charges as they
were added to the monthly bill; and charged each customer three dollars
every month for this merchandise.98 In support of their allegations,
plaintiffs cited two sources of law that made sending unsolicited
merchandise an illegal act per se.99 Plaintiffs sought class certification,
damages, and an injunction prohibiting defendant from engaging in
further unfair and deceptive trade practices.100

Id.
Id.
95
Time Warner Entm’t Co. v. Whiteman, 802 N.E.2d 886, 892 (Ind. 2004); see Brown v.
SBC Commc’ns, Inc., No. 05-cv-777-JPG, 2007 WL 684133 (S.D. Ill. Mar. 1, 2007);
MacDonnell v. PHH Mortg. Corp., 846 N.Y.S.2d 223, 224 (App. Div. 2007) (barring the VPD
when plaintiffs assert a statutory cause of action).
96
Huch v. Charter Commc’ns, Inc., 290 S.W.3d 721, 723 (Mo. 2009) (en banc).
97
Id.
98
Id.
99
Id. at 723, 725 (citing MO. REV. STAT. §§ 407.025, 407.200 (2006); MO. CODE REGS. ANN.
tit. 15, § 60-8.060 (2011)).
100
Huch, 290 S.W.3d at 723.
93
94
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D. Procedural History
At the trial court level, Charter moved to dismiss the claim, citing the
VPD as a defense.101 The trial court granted the motion and dismissed
the claim with prejudice on May 21, 2007.102 In its rationale, the trial
court stated that plaintiffs knew or should have known of the additional
charges and, without evidence of mistake or duress, the VPD precluded
recovery.103
On April 15, 2008, the Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the
motion to dismiss the claim in an opinion that outlined some of the
historic reasons for the VPD.104 The court of appeals stated that when a
customer pays a fee, even if it is unfair or improper, payment operates as
a waiver to any suit, claim, or recovery for a plaintiff class.105 The
appellate court found that the plaintiffs’ citations to cases from other
states, which held that the VPD affirmative defense was against public
policy, and many of the Missouri cases cited in the brief lacked merit and
were “not on point.”106 Further, the court concluded that the MMPA’s
statutory framework allowed affirmative defenses such as the VPD. The
court cited a 1923 Missouri Supreme Court case that preceded the
MMPA by more than forty years.107 Finally, despite the plaintiffs’
arguments that the alleged conduct constituted consumer fraud and
qualified under the fraud exception to the VPD, the court held that the
plaintiffs had not properly pled the elements of common law fraud. The
court’s implication was clear: Consumer fraud was not an exception to
the VPD. The court concluded that since the charges were in the
plaintiffs’ bill, they knew or should have known of these charges.
Therefore, the VPD precluded the claim and the court affirmed the trial
court’s judgment.108 The plaintiffs petitioned for review, and the
Missouri Supreme Court ordered transfer on June 24, 2008.109

101
Order and Judgment, Huch v. Charter Commc’ns, Inc., No. 06CC-3434, 2007 WL
5086331, at A15 (Mo. Cir. Ct. May 21, 2007).
102
Id. at A16.
103
Id. at A15.
104
Huch v. Charter Commc’ns, Inc., No. ED 89926, 2008 WL 1721868, at *1 (Mo. Ct. App.
Apr. 15, 2008).
105
Id. at *4.
106
Id. at *5.
107
Id. at *8 (citing Ferguson v. Butler Cnty., 247 S.W. 795, 796–97 (Mo. 1923)).
108
Id. at *1.
109
Huch v. Charter Commc’ns Inc., 290 S.W.3d 721, 722 (Mo. 2009) (en banc).
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E. Protect the Prey Not the Predators: The Missouri Supreme Court’s Ruling
The Missouri Supreme Court, en banc, held that the VPD was not
available as an affirmative defense to the defendant’s violations of the
MMPA. The court reversed the trial court decision on the grounds of
public policy and legislative intent.110 The court based its rationale
largely on the legislative intent, scope, and protections of the MMPA in
disavowing certain legal principles, such as waiver and the VPD.111
When considering legislative intent, the court stated that section 404.020
of the MMPA was “intended . . . to ‘supplement the definitions of
common law fraud in an attempt to preserve fundamental honesty, fair
play and right dealings in public transactions.’” Thus, the MMPA was
enacted to protect consumers in modern commerce transactions in a
paternalistic fashion.112 The court stated that the very nature of the
MMPA and its language is clear and to be construed broadly. It held
that to effectuate the protections prescribed in the statute, certain legal
principles are not available as defenses against consumer actions,
including the VPD.113 The MMPA was designed to regulate consumer
transactions in which businesses have superior access to resources,
information, and remedies. Therefore, the waiver-based common law
VPD defense stands in direct conflict with the Missouri legislature’s
intent.114 The legislature drafted and passed the MMPA to provide clear
relief to consumers. Concerting with this legislative intent, Missouri
courts had already rejected various legal remedies under the MMPA
before Huch, establishing a clear trend toward limiting affirmative
defenses to MMPA-based claims to protect injured consumers.115 The
court recognized “the Eighth Circuit[’s] . . . holding that the ‘public
policy [behind the MMPA] is so strong that parties will not be allowed to
waive its benefits,’” certifying the position that certain legal remedies are
not available to protect consumers.116 The court also recognized this
principle one year later, in High Life Sales Co. v. Brown-Forman Corp.117 It
held that enforcing a contract’s forum selection clause was unreasonable
and based its holding on a vital state interest in protecting local liquor
distributors from questionable and unjustified termination of their
Id. at 727.
Id.
112
Id. at 724 (quoting State ex rel. Danforth v. Independence Dodge, Inc., 494 S.W.2d 362,
368 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973)).
113
Id. at 725–26.
114
Id. at 726–27.
115
Id.
116
Id. at 725–26 (quoting Elec. & Magneto Serv. Co. v. AMBAC Int’l Corp., 941 F.2d 660,
664 (8th Cir. 1991)).
117
823 S.W.2d 493, 498 (Mo. 1992) (en banc).
110
111
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franchises.118 In addition, the Huch court acknowledged the court’s
holding in Whitney v. Alltel Communications, Inc. that an arbitration clause
was unconscionable and unenforceable when clashing with unfair
practices described in the MMPA, and recognized that not even estoppel
is allowed as a defense to fraudulent conduct.119 These cases reinforce
the position that the MMPA is protectionist for classes of consumers and
that waiver under these claims is against state policy, state law, and
renders all Missouri statutory MMPA law meaningless.120
The Missouri Supreme Court responded to defendant’s argument
that the VPD remained vital and preeminent by pointing out that in Eisel
v. Midwest BankCentre it had already “held that the [VPD] is ‘not
applicable in all situations.’”121 In Eisel, the consumers paid fees for
document preparation, which the court found was an unauthorized
practice of law, rendering the VPD unavailable to the defendant.122 The
court specifically precluded the use of the VPD because the type of
unfair and inequitable business practices outlined in the MMPA “are not
subject to waiver, consent or lack of objection by the victim.”123 The
court held that allowing the VPD to be used by corporate defendants
profanely distributes the burden onto the least powerful and
knowledgeable party and erodes the very protections the statute in
question created for consumers.124
The Missouri Supreme Court in Huch II applied these cases along
with the legislative intent of the MMPA. The court found that the
defendant’s practices of sending the unsolicited program guide to the
plaintiffs and charging them without notice, disclosure, or authorization
was an unfair practice.125 The plaintiffs’ paying for the services under
the VPD does not preclude the suit, and any usage of the VPD in a
consumer class action under the MMPA is against public policy.126
Moreover, the court held that the defendant’s use of the VPD as an
affirmative defense was an attempt to undermine the very fabric of the
consumer protection statute, and it defied clear Missouri legislative

Huch, 290 S.W.3d at 725.
Id. at 726 (citing Whitney v. Alltel Commc’ns, Inc., 173 S.W.3d 300, 314 (Mo. Ct. App.
2005)).
120
Id. at 726–27.
121
Huch, 290 S.W.3d at 727 (quoting Eisel v. Midwest BankCentre, 230 S.W.3d 335, 339
(Mo. 2007) (en banc)).
122
Id.
123
Id. (quoting Eisel, 230 S.W.3d at 339) (internal quotation marks omitted).
124
Id.
125
Id.
126
Id.
118
119
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intent to protect both the consumers and business marketplace from
unfair practices.127
IV. DOOMED: THE IMPACT OF HUCH AND THE FUTURE OF THE VPD
The VPD is a relic: Bargaining power is institutionally and
systematically slanted toward corporations; consumer statutes have
increased the amount of protection available to consumers; and financial
fraud has been present for decades. Global trends, U.S. state court
decisions, and recent corporate fraud scandals all argue for an end to the
VPD and for the preservation of consumer rights.
A. United Kingdom and Common Law World Abolishes the VPD
The extermination of the VPD has already begun. The very country
that spawned the VPD’s existence two centuries ago has now abolished
it because it is improper for modern jurisprudence.128 In the 1999
landmark decision Kleinwort Benson Ltd. v. Lincoln City Council, the
House of Lords in the United Kingdom held that “the mistake of law
[VPD] can no longer be allowed to survive.”129 In Kleinwort, appellant
banks had made payments to local authorities using interest swap
transactions. Both parties presumed these were proper transactions, but
they were later voided by the House of Lords on ultra vires grounds.130
Lord Goff established a three-prong rationale for destroying the two
hundred year-old VPD doctrine: (1) the VPD encourages unjust
enrichment; (2) mistake of law and mistake of fact are no longer
recognized as significant distinctions; and (3) judicial manipulation of
the VPD to ensure variable results has left both the courts and litigants in
a stream of unpredictable madness.131 Lord Berwick simply found the
VPD to be “indefensible” to litigants of modest means and limited legal
knowledge, noting that the very reason there is a cause of action for
unjust enrichment is “because [the] law, unlike facts, can change.”132 The
House of Lords concluded that the long history of the VPD had run its
course and that the “rule . . . cannot sensibly survive in a [modern] rubric
of the law.” 133 Around the world, over sixty percent of common law

Id.
Kleinwort Benson Ltd. v. Lincoln City Council, [1999] 2 A.C. 349 (H.L.) (appeal taken
from Eng.).
129
Id. at 373.
130
Id. at 353–54.
131
Id. at 372–73.
132
Id. at 390–92.
133
Id. at 373.
127
128
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countries have already abolished the VPD.134 In its Kleinwort opinion, the
House of Lords noted that several European countries including
Germany, France, and Italy had already done away with their form of
the VPD.135 Germany, France, and Italy shared a common fear of
floodgate litigation as a result of lifting the VPD; however, the House of
Lords noted there had been no flood or disruption of judicial economy.136
Canada, Australia, South Africa, and Scotland abrogated the VPD
judicially, and New Zealand abolished it by statute.137 In her article,
Mistake of Law Rule Abrogated, Louisa Ho stated that soon the Hong Kong
courts would follow the trend of eliminating the VPD, asserting that
“[a]fter all, it has never been disputed that the default rules of restitution
can be superseded by voluntary agreement.”138 There is a growing
global consensus that the VPD doctrine has truly become an eighteenth
century theory that has no place and purpose in twentieth century global
jurisprudence.
B. Current United States Status of the VPD
Before Huch I, many states had either never allowed the VPD to
come into existence or judicially overruled its usage. As the twentieth
century came to a close, so did the VPD in various courts across the
nation. These courts provided the rationale,139 policy,140 and foundation

See supra notes 77–79 (discussing the rise of UDAP provisions to protect consumers).
Kleinwort, [1999] 2 A.C. at 374.
136
Id.
137
Aedit Abdullah, The Abrogation of the Rule Against Recovery in Mistake of Law, 1998
SING. J. LEGAL STUD. 469, 469 (1998).
138
Lusina Ho, Mistake of Law Rule Abrogated, H.K. LAW., Feb. 1999, at 34–35.
139
See BMG Direct Mktg., Inc. v. Peake, 178 S.W.3d 763, 771 (Tex. 2005). Even in states
where the doctrine was once rigorously enforced, there has been a steady retreat. Consider
this statement from the Texas Supreme Court:
[A]lthough the voluntary-payment rule may have been widely used by
parties and some Texas courts at one time, its scope has diminished as
the rule’s equitable policy concerns have been addressed through
statutory or other legal remedies. Indeed, this Court has affirmatively
applied the rule only once in the last forty years, and that holding has
itself been modified since.
Id.
140
Huch v. Charter Commc’ns Inc., 290 S.W.3d 721, 721 (Mo. 2009); see Alvarez v.
Pappas, 890 N.E.2d 434, 444 (Ill. 2008) (explaining that the VPD is “often harsh in its
application”); Getto v. City of Chicago, 426 N.E.2d 844, 850 (Ill. 1981) (noting that the threat
of shutting off phone service due to nonpayment of charges resulted in an obligation that
would bar application of the VPD); see also Brisbane v. Dacres, (1813) 5 Taunt. 143, 147
(explaining that retention by the recipient of monies paid by mistake is only proper where
“it be consistent with honour and conscience to retain it”); S.L.C., Note, The VoluntaryPayment Doctrine in Georgia, 16 GA. L. REV. 893, 916 (1982) (reiterating that Georgia relies on
134
135
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for what became Huch II.141 The requiem for the VPD had begun, and
the Missouri Supreme Court was not alone in valuing consumer
protection and legislative intent over the shifty and rogue VPD defense.
1.

The Aftermath of Huch II in United States Courts

Huch II has already inspired three states to revisit their position on
the VPD in the past year. Georgia, Nevada, and Washington have
followed Huch II by removing the VPD as a defense to consumer class
action lawsuits and noting that the protections of the legislature override
vague common law defenses like the VPD.142 In McGinnis v. T-Mobile
USA, Inc.,143 the U.S. District Court for the Western District of
Washington stated that the VPD is inapplicable to class actions based on
the CPA about hidden international charges in customers’ phone bills.
This January 2010 decision reinforced a 2007 Supreme Court of
Washington ruling, which held the VPD was an inappropriate defense
given the purpose of the CPA.144 The Supreme Court of Georgia, in
March 2010, proclaimed that “the clear purpose of the Natural Gas Act is
to protect natural gas consumers . . . [and that this] must prevail over the
the unjust enrichment principles, rather than the VPD because it lacks clarity and
uniformity).
141
290 S.W.3d at 721; see Time Warner Entm’t Co. v. Whiteman, 802 N.E.2d 886, 893 (Ind.
2004) (providing one of the more striking examples of the expansion of the duress
exception). In Time Warner Entertainment Co., the Indiana Supreme Court held that the
VPD did not prevent the plaintiff-cable television customers from recovering late-fee
payments in excess of the actual damages suffered by the cable company as a result of the
late payments. Id. at 893. The court’s rationale was that the plaintiffs were forced into a
situation where they had to make the payment to receive the property promised to them
under the contract, i.e., their cable TV, whereas plaintiffs in similar cases where the VPD
was applied had not been threatened with immediate deprivation of goods or services if
they did not pay. Id. at 891. Recent history shows a movement away from the VPD. See id.
(noting that the old version of the Restatement of Restitution supports the VPD, the new
draft of the Restatement “eliminates it”). In some states, the VPD has been literally or
virtually abandoned. See, e.g., Sobel v. Hertz Corp., 698 F. Supp. 2d 1218, 1224 (D. Nev.
2010); McGinnis v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., No. C08-106Z, 2010 WL 276230, at *1 (W.D. Wash.
Jan. 20, 2010); Brown v. SBC Commc’ns, Inc., No. 05-cv-777-JPG, 2007 WL 684133, at * 9
(S.D. Ill. Mar. 1, 2007); Southstar Energy Servs., LLC v. Ellison, 691 S.E.2d 203, 205 (Ga.
2010); Alvarez, 890 N.E.2d at 444 (explaining that the VPD is “often harsh in its
application”); Getto, 426 N.E.2d at 850 (noting that the threat of shutting off phone service
due to nonpayment of charges resulted in an obligation that would bar application of the
VPD); Time Warner Entm’t Co., 802 N.E.2d at 892; MacDonell v. PHH Mortg. Corp., 846
N.Y.S.2d 223, 224 (App. Div. 2007); Pratt v. Smart Corp., 968 S.W.2d 868, 872 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 1997); BMG Direct Mktg., Inc., 178 S.W.3d at 771.
142
See Sobel, 698 F. Supp. 2d at 1222–24; McGinnis, No. C08-106Z, 2010 WL 276230, at *1;
Southstar Energy Servs., LLC, 691 S.E.2d at 206.
143
McGinnis, 2010 WL 276230, at *1.
144
Id.
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general . . . [VPD],” in response to a class action suit involving
overpayments to a natural gas marketer.145 The court cited to Huch II
and found that allowing the VPD as a defense would be “contrary to the
intent of the legislature” and such protectionist private rights of action.146
Sobel v. Hertz Corp., decided in late March 2010, strongly captured
Huch II’s impact. The Nevada District Court used Huch II as the very
foundation to deny the VPD’s usage as an affirmative defense to a class
action on airport concession fees.147 Despite otherwise finding that the
Nevada Deceptive Trade Practices Act had not been violated, the court
took it upon itself to thoroughly assess how Missouri’s rationale in
supporting consumers over predatory business actions clearly precludes
the usage of the VPD.148 Strangely enough, the defendant had relied
upon the Missouri Appellate Western Court decision that found the VPD
precluded a class action under the MMPA, and it argued that Nevada
should follow that reasoning along with the reasoning in an 1887
Nevada Supreme Court case supporting usage of the VPD.149 During
litigation, the Missouri Supreme Court delivered the Huch II decision;
the Nevada court denied the VPD defense after finding “the reasoning of
Huch II and the cases in line with Huch II convincing . . . [to enforce]
‘paternalistic legislation designed to protect those that could not
otherwise protect themselves.’”150
The actions of the Nevada, Georgia, and Washington courts illustrate
that the era of the VPD defense against statutory-based consumer rights
is over. Furthermore, the VPD is already abolished or relegated to
antiquity in at least seven states.151 The modern trend and post-Huch
focus is to limit the VPD to common law claims and strip any affirmative
defense against class actions where consumers are misled, deceived, or
defrauded by corporations.

Southstar Energy Servs., 691 S.E.2d at 205.
Id. at 206 (quoting Huch v. Charter Communications, 290 S.W.3d 721, 727 (Mo. 2009))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
147
Sobel, 698 F. Supp. 2d at 1223–24.
148
Id. at 1218, 1224.
149
Id. at 1230; see also id. at 1222–23 (noting the defendant’s reliance on Huch I and a
Nevada Supreme Court decision in 1887).
150
Id. at 1223–24 (quoting Huch v. Charter Commc’ns, 290 S.W.3d 721, 727 (Mo. 2009)).
151
See Sobel, 698 F. Supp. 2d at 1224; McGinnis v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., No. C08-106Z, 2010
WL 276230, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 20, 2010); Brown v. SBC Commc’ns, Inc., No. 05-cv-777JPG, 2007 WL 684133, at * 9 (S.D. Ill. Mar. 1, 2007); Southstar Energy Servs., LLC v. Ellison,
691 S.E.2d 203, 205 (Ga. 2010); Time Warner Entm’t Co. v. Whiteman, 802 N.E.2d 886, 893
(Ind. 2004); MacDonell v. PHH Mortg. Corp., 846 N.Y.S.2d 223, 224 (App. Div. 2007); Pratt
v. Smart Corp., 968 S.W.2d 868, 872 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997).
145
146
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V. DERANGED: THE USAGE OF THE VPD IN AN ERA OF CORPORATE GREED
AND MARKET MELTDOWNS
This is an era of corporate fraud, consumer fraud, and economic
tension where public policy concerns warrant more protection for
consumers. Spanning the past decade, some of the most prominent and
sophisticated entities in our business markets have engaged in an
endless array of illegal conduct.152 Meanwhile, on the consumer-level,
there is a staggering amount of new and refined frauds perpetrated on
the American public. These include identity fraud,153 a host of illegal
activities regarding subprime loans,154 a growing number of debt
adjusting scams,155 and rampant general consumer fraud ranging from
deceptive advertising to “cramming” of charges on bills.156 The
vulnerability of the American consumer increases as mass transactions
conducted over long distances by phone, mail, fax, or internet become
the norm. In response to this, legislatures, based largely on the Federal
Trade Commission’s policies regarding consumer fraud, have enacted
more consumer statutes that enable recovery.157 As discussed, these
statutes—often referred to collectively as “Little FTC Acts” or UDAP
statutes—are designed to supplement common law fraud remedies,
thereby providing a more flexible tool to hold companies accountable.158
Most of these statutes provide for class actions, making certain that a
company that extracts a few dollars from millions of consumers can still
be held accountable despite the fact that an individual claim would make
no economic sense.

152
Associated Press, Corporate Fraud Scandals Since 2002, U.S.A. TODAY (July 17, 2007, 4:46
PM), http://www.usatoday.com/news/topstories/2007-07-17-3330759536_x.htm.
153
FED. TRADE COMM’N, CONSUMER FRAUD IN THE U.S.: AN FTC SURVEY 8–9 (2004).
154
JOINT ECON. COMM., SUBPRIME MORTGAGE MARKET CRISIS TIMELINE 1–2 (July 2008),
available at http://jec.senate.gov/public/?a=Files.Serve&File_id=4cdd7384-dbf6-40e6-adbc789f69131903.
155
Credit-Repair Scams, MO. ATT’Y GEN. CHRIS KOSTER, http://ago.mo.gov/publications/
creditrepair.htm (last visited Jan. 13, 2011); Frauds and Scams, ATT’Y GEN. OF TEX. GREG
ABBOTT, http://www.oag.state.tx.us/consumer/scams.shtml (last updated Apr. 5, 2011);
Frequently asked Questions—Debt Adjuster, STATE OF N.J. DEP’T OF BANKING AND INS.,
http://www.state.nj.us/dobi/banklicensing/debtadjusterfaq.html (last visited Jan. 13,
2008); Herb Weisbaum, Debt Relief Deals ‘Preying on Consumer’s Trust’, MSNBC.COM,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/18155301/ (last updated Apr. 17, 2007).
156
Cramming: Mystery Phone Charges, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Feb. 2009), http://www.ftc.
gov/bcp/edu/pubs/consumer/products/pro18.shtm;
Unauthorized,
Misleading,
or
Deceptive Charges Placed on Your Telephone Bill—“Cramming”, FED. COMMC’N,
http://transition.fcc.gov/cgb/consumerfacts/cramming.pdf (last visited Jan. 13, 2011).
157
NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., supra note 79, at 1–3.
158
Id.
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It is true that corporate fraud and scandal is not exclusive to the
twenty-first century, but the last decade has seen consumers—and the
economy as a whole—damaged by schemes that once were only
conceived of in movies and novels.159 In the world of
telecommunications, WorldCom, after merging with MCI (one of the
largest mergers to date), was found in 2000 to have committed fraud in
under-representing line costs and inflating revenues in bogus accounting
entries.160 This was only the beginning of a decade marked by ever
larger scandals and collapses. Immediately following WorldCom in
2002, Fortune magazine’s “Most Admired” innovative energy company,
Enron, completely imploded as the world learned of its illegal actions:
bribing foreign officials, false accounting, and manipulating energy
markets to artificially inflate electricity costs for consumers on the west
coast of the United States.161 In 2002 alone, there were over twenty
corporate scandals with illegal, fraudulent, and improper conduct from
companies such as AOL Time Warner, Arthur Andersen, Duke Energy,
Halliburton, Kmart, Qwest, Tyco, and Xerox, just to name a few.162 This
massive pattern of fraud by parties that were sophisticated and
entrusted with billions of dollars of securities, pensions, and employee
livelihoods established the need for regulatory action. The free market
was not solving its own problems; it was drowning in greed.163 The
corporate greed spilled over, or in some cases began, in the consumer
markets. Confidence scams and identity theft alone affect over 30
million victims per year;164 there are nearly 10 million victims in the

159
BOILER ROOM (New Line Cinema 2000); FUN WITH DICK AND JANE (Colum. Pictures
2005); WALL STREET (Twentieth Century Fox 1987).
160
Susan Pulliam & Deborah Soloman, How Three Unlikely Sleuths Exposed Fraud at
WorldCom: Firm’s Own Employees Sniffed Out Cryptic Clues and Followed Hunches, WALL ST.
J., Oct. 30, 2002, 4:58 PM, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1035929943494003751.html.
161
See BETHANY MCLEAN & PETER ELKIND, THE SMARTEST GUYS IN THE ROOM: THE
AMAZING RISE AND SCANDALOUS FALL OF ENRON (2003); William W. Bratton, Enron and the
Dark Side of Shareholder Value, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1275, 1357–59 (2002); Paul M. Healy & Krishna
G. Palepu, The Fall of Enron, 17 J. ECON. PERSP. 3, 3 (2003); Tapes: Enron Plotted to Shut Down
Power Plant, CNN.COM (Feb. 3, 2005, 11:28 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2005/US/02/03/
enron.tapes/.
162
Penelope Patsuris, The Corporate Scandal Sheet, FORBES.COM (Aug. 26, 2002, 5:30PM),
www.forbes.com/2002/07/25/accountingtracker_print.html.
163
See JOHN CASSIDY, HOW MARKETS FAIL: THE LOGIC OF ECONOMIC CALAMITIES (2009);
WILLIAM D. COHAN, HOUSE OF CARDS: A TALE OF HUBRIS AND WRETCHED EXCESS ON WALL
STREET (2009); SEBASTIAN MALLABY, MORE MONEY THAN GOD: HEDGE FUNDS AND THE
MAKING OF A NEW ELITE (2010); ANDREW ROSS SORKIN, TOO BIG TO FAIL: THE INSIDE STORY
OF HOW WALL STREET AND WASHINGTON FOUGHT TO SAVE THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM FROM
CRISIS—AND THEMSELVES (2009).
164
FED. TRADE COMM’N, CONSUMER FRAUD IN THE UNITED STATES: THE SECOND FTC
SURVEY S-1 (2007).
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United States.165 The forms range from primitively deceptive to scams so
complex that it takes several governmental agencies to put an end to the
conduct.166 The fraud in the subprime market was almost too pervasive
to recount. While Wall Street companies invented derivatives and
figured out ways to turn bundles of subprime loans into AAA rated
securities, consumers were in the cross-hairs at the ground level.167
Perpetrators committed an almost endless string of frauds to fuel Wall
Street’s need for more subprime paper.168 Appraisers over-appraised
homes; talking heads promised a housing market that would never
decline; “liar loans” in which no documents are required to get a loan
became the norm; 169 pre-payment penalties were imbedded in almost
every loan; adjustable rates that could only go up (exploding ARMS)
were buried in fine print; and companies like Countrywide and
Ameriquest sponsored Super Bowls and other events while building a
Therefore, to
true house of cards grounded upon subprime loans.170
165
See SYNOVATE, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION—2006 IDENTITY THEFT SURVEY REPORT 3
(2007) (reporting 8.3 million fraud victims in 2005); Elizabeth D. De Armond, Frothy Chaos:
Modern Data Warehousing and Old-Fashioned Defamation, 41 VAL. U. L. REV. 1061, 1078 (2007)
(explaining that technological advances have caused identity theft cases to soar); Kamaal
Zaidi, Identity Theft and Consumer Protection: Finding Sensible Approaches to Safeguard
Personal Data in the United States and Canada, 19 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 99, 109–10 (2007)
(explaining that there were 10 million reported cases of identity theft in 2004); Jennifer
Lynch, Note, Identity Theft in Cyberspace: Crime Control Methods and Their Effectiveness in
Combating Phishing Attacks, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 259, 261 (2005) (reporting that 9.9 million
Americans were victims in 2002).
166
See De Armond, supra note 165, at 1078–79 (explaining typical identity theft cases);
Christopher P. Couch, Forcing the Choice Between Commerce and Consumers: Application of the
FRCA to Identity Theft, 53 ALA. L. REV. 583, 584–86 (2002) (describing common types of
identity theft); Thomas L. Friedman, Gonna Need a Bigger Boat, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2008, at
12; ‘Malicious’ Mortgage Fraud: More Than 400 Charged Nationwide, FBI (June 19, 2008),
http://www.fbi.gov/page2/june08/malicious_mortgage061908.html.
167
See Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Reserve, Speech at UC Berkeley/UCLA
Symposium: The Mortg. Meltdown, the Econ., and Pub. Policy (Oct., 31 2008).
168
Id.; see Associated Press, FBI Investigating Potential Fraud by Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac,
Lehman, AIG, FOX NEWS (Sept. 23, 2008), http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,
426783,00.html; Chris Arnold, Former Ameriquest Workers Tell of Deception, NPR (May 14,
2007), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=10165859.
169
Bob Ivry, Subprime ‘Liar Loans’ Fuel Bust with $1 Billion Fraud (Update 1),
BLOOMBERG.COM (Apr. 25, 2007, 4:21PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=
newsarchive&sid=aN2DPRuRs93M.
170
See Ameriquest Accused of ‘Boiler Room’ Tactics, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Feb. 5, 2005),
http://educationcenter2000.com/Articles_Folder/Ameriquest.htm; Kevin Bohn, FBI Probes
Countrywide for Possible Fraud, CNN MONEY (Mar. 8, 2008), http://money.cnn.com/2008/
03/08/news/companies/countrywide_FBI/?postversion=2008031003; Chris Isidore, ‘Liar
Loans’:
Mortgage woes beyond subprime, CNNMONEY (Mar. 18, 2007, 5:01 pm),
http://money.cnn.com/2007/03/19/news/economy/next_subprime/index.htm.
See
generally MICHAEL LEWIS, THE BIG SHORT: INSIDE THE DOOMSDAY MACHINE (2010)
(describing the rampant frauds that occurred in the early 2000s).
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say consumer fraud is rampant is probably an understatement. In the
last major FTC study on fraud using national data in 2005, there was a
reported level of “48.7 million incidents” of fraud on consumers.171
Consumers’ trust in products, companies, and services has waned as the
scams and predators have grown.172 Although it is fair to suggest that
consumer confidence is largely eroded by economic conditions, one
cannot discount the effect perpetual reports of fraud have on consumer
According to the FTC, the top scams are
confidence indices.173
“weight-loss products,” “foreign lotteries,” “prize promotions,” and
“work-at-home programs.”174 Far more disturbing is the population
segment that is targeted. Data suggests that those hit hardest tend to be
those with less education and lower income. In some cases, consumer
fraud targets those who have already been defrauded with over 11.7
million people being preyed on by more than one scheme.175 Common
examples include loan restructuring, credit refinancing, or debt
consolidation scams that take an already-vulnerable and financially
damaged party, promise them help, and then catapult them into
complete bankruptcy and desperation.176
Against even this cursory look at an ocean of fraudulent behavior, it
is evident there is no place for the VPD in modern consumer
transactions. The VPD rests upon the premise that a party may
sometimes keep illegal gains because the other party knew it was
overpaying (or at least could have known) and paid anyway. There is no
place for the “finders keepers” mentality fostered by the VPD in today’s
fast-paced world where consumers battle with sophisticated companies
and billing occurs through mass mailings, online bill payments, and
credit card swipes. As noted in the amicus brief for Huch II, the demise
of the VPD has correlated with a rise in protectionist statutes passed by
states for their resident consumers.177 Legislatures throughout the
country have made clear that in a market in which bargaining power has
FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 164, at S-1.
Lauren L. Sullins, Comment, “Phishing” for a Solution: Domestic and International
Approaches to Decreasing Online Identity Theft, 20 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 397, 403 (2006)
(explaining that as scams such as phishing increase consumer confidence decreases);
American’s Consumer Confidence in Sharp Decline, BLOOMBERG.COM, http://www.bloomberg.
com/apps/data?pid=avimage&iid=i.hcOXt8LDF4 (last visited Jan. 13, 2011).
173
United States Consumer Confidence, TRADING ECONOMICS, http://www.trading
economics.com/united-states/consumer-confidence (last visited Feb. 2, 2012).
174
FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 164, at S-1–S-2.
175
See id. at 15 (“11.7 million [victims] experienced one or both of the two more general
frauds covered in the survey—paying for a product or service that was never received or
being billed for a service . . . the customer had not agreed to purchase.”).
176
Id. at 53.
177
Huch v. Charter Commc’ns Inc., 290 S.W.3d 721, 727 (Mo. 2009).
171
172
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shifted considerably into the hands of the corporations and modern
merchants, there must be meaningful remedies for harmed consumers.
The profit motive is amoral, not immoral, and the legal structure must
make certain that economic incentives encourage playing by the rules,
not cheating. Legislatures recognize this, and through the creation of
UDAP statutes, they have placed the economic incentives squarely on
playing by the rules by ensuring that businesses can face claims that
could cost them actual damages, punitive damages, and attorneys’ fees.
This creates a level playing field for consumers and businesses, and in
doing so allows consumers to trust that they can spend freely.
The VPD is antithetical to these ideals and stands as an antiquated
doctrine in today’s modern world. It is almost an absurd concept that in
the twenty-first century a consumer who was the victim of fraud, or even
negligent billing by a powerful corporation, would be barred from
recovery simply because she did not immediately catch the deception or
mistake. Yet, the VPD demands that outcome. It is a license to steal in
an era of powerful thieves that, if allowed, would eradicate far too many
consumer claims. The VPD places an economic incentive on tack-on
charges or excessive fees, and in doing so, is antithetical to the intent of
the legislatures and the express will of the people.
VI. CONCLUSION
The courts, the legislatures, and even the very country that spawned
the VPD have started the funeral procession for the VPD. As the House
of Lords and several U.S. state supreme courts have stated, the VPD has
no place in modern jurisprudence. The VPD was born in an era of
commerce and mercantilism when the consumer may have known as
much as or more than the seller and deals were carried out face to face
over a handshake. Thus, the VPD is outdated and ill-suited to the
modern, mass transaction, automated world.
Small predatory
companies litter the marketplace, buying information from third parties
to create schemes that are streamlined to leave consumers with nothing.
Huge monoliths of the business world actively engage in sophisticated
fraud that leaves stock markets crashed, gatekeepers and regulators
astounded or indicted, and the American consumer at risk. Although
many critics may call for deregulation and Keynesian adherence to the
idea that markets, sacred and perfect with minimal governmental
regulation, will protect consumers, it is time to put such quaint ideas
aside. Markets will work, but only when hard work and fair dealing are
guaranteed a reward, and slight-of-hand and carelessness are
guaranteed to cost money. Strong consumer remedies must be part of
the antidote to the growing wave of fraud. The VPD threatens these
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simple ideals, and as such, must be fully eliminated from the consumer
realm for the good of the market, including all of its participants.
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